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ABSTRACT 
 
This study uses ordinary least squares estimation to test multivariate models in order to 
find out whether or not crude oil price shocks are contractionary and negatively impact 
the macroeconomy.  Variables are annual and pertain to different aspects of crude oil and 
how they affect real gross domestic product (GDP).  It is predicted that increases in 
domestic and imported crude oil prices negatively affect real GDP by decreasing not only 
energy consumption but the consumption of other goods and services as well.  It is found 
that the initial hypothesis is partially correct.  While increases in imported oil prices do 
decrease real GDP, increases in domestic oil prices actually increase real GDP.  
Additionally, as predicted, consumption other than energy is affected by crude oil price 
shocks and causes real GDP to contract. 
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Section 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between the price of crude oil and GDP has been one of constant 
change.  It arguably had everything to do with the economic downturn during the late 
1970’s and mid 1980’s and possibly nothing to do with the most recent recession.  There 
is a possibility that energy price shocks are exogenous to the United States’ 
macroeconomic well-being.
1
  One reason for this is that consumers are known to smooth 
their consumption across commodities in order to gain maximum utility over all their 
goods and services, implying that a correlation exists between increases in the price of 
crude oil and macroeconomic aggregates, but may not necessarily infer causation.
2
  This 
could be a possible answer as to why recessionary characteristics were not seen during 
the recent spike in oil prices.  According to Killian (2008), ten of the last recessions were 
preceded by oil price spikes which might suggest that higher oil prices do in fact cause 
recessions.  When this does in fact take place and higher oil prices are followed by a 
recession, it is likely due to unemployment and inflation levels being affected.  However, 
when the tenth post war United States recession began in 2001, from 2001 to 2003 
unemployment rose almost 28%.  Then in 2003 the United States experienced an energy 
crisis.  What is interesting about this is that once the energy crisis began, it is thought that 
it would be followed by typical recessionary characteristics.  Surprisingly enough, 
macroeconomic variables such as output and unemployment moved in unexpected 
                                                          
1
 Shocks refer to price increases. 
2
 Goods and services here refer to goods and services less energy. 
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directions.
3
  Output went up by a little more than 5% from 2003 to 2006.  During the 
same time, unemployment decreased by more than 23%.
4
  An explanation for this could 
be that in the short run, the positive effects outweigh the negative due to global 
commodity prices being sticky (Killian 2008). 
It is in fact possible that crude oil energy prices are endogenous, with respect to 
the macroeconomic condition of the United States.
5
  However, it depends on which 
aspect of the macroeconomy one is referring to.  For example, it may be the case that 
increased energy prices will produce macroeconomic externalities due to consumers and 
firms altering their expenditures on durable and non-durable goods and decreasing their 
consumption of energy, bringing down overall consumption and negatively impacting 
GDP. 
In an attempt to answer whether or not crude oil energy prices have a causal effect 
on the GDP of the United States, ordinary least squares (OLS) will be used in order to 
figure out which factors of the oil industry are most significant to the  domestic 
macroeconomy and in turn have the most effect on GDP.  Do spikes in the import price 
of crude oil decrease consumption patterns and make it a demand side problem?  Or does 
it affect the prevalence of capital, labor and production making it detrimental to the 
supply side of the macroeconomy?   
                                                          
3
 Output refers to Business Sector Output per hour of all persons indexed at 2005=100.  The 
Unemployment rate is the Civilian Unemployment Rate that is a percentage of the labor force.  Both 
variables are annual, and seasonally adjusted. 
4
 See www.bls.gov/data 
5
 Endogeneity here refers to a possibility of reverse causality between energy prices and macroeconomic 
aggregates. 
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The hypothesis is that domestic price and production as well as imported price 
and quantity will have significant effects on real GDP.  More specifically the prediction 
is that increases in domestic and imported crude oil prices will decrease real GDP.  This 
is due to the belief that increases in these prices will decrease the demand for all products 
(not just crude oil and petroleum commodities).  As consumers attempt to smooth their 
consumption, they will consume less of goods and services excluding energy in order to 
maintain their initial consumption of crude oil and petroleum products.  This will then 
cause overall consumption to drop and eventually bring down GDP.  If this happens to be 
the case, crude oil price shocks should then be considered a demand side problem that 
causes contractionary characteristics on the domestic macroeconomy.  Based on the 
obtained results, recommendations will be made to guide energy policies in such a way as 
to avoid macro externalities.  
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Section 2 
HISTORY OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS 
Prior to 1970 crude oil was abundant and had stable price behavior (Nordhaus 
2007).  Domestic oil production peaked in 1972 and then started declining.  This led to a 
higher import share of crude oil.  The price of crude oil then began to rapidly increase 
over the next decade.  Aside from that, during the early 1970’s the United States no 
longer allowed foreign central banks to convert dollars to gold.  The end of the Bretton 
Woods system then caused a depreciation of the dollar.
6
  Once the dollar had less 
purchasing power on the international market, the dollar price increased for many 
internationally traded commodities, including oil.  Prices increased and real interest rates 
fell.  Furthermore, in 1971 President Nixon implemented wage and price controls in an 
attempt to hinder climbing inflation rates.  This was a complete failure.  These events, 
along with the OPEC embargo during 1973 and 1974 led to massive increases in the price 
of crude oil.
7
  In 1973, Syria and Egypt attacked Israel and Arab members of OPEC 
announced an embargo on countries that were thought to be supporters of Israel 
(Hamilton 2011).  This of course led to a significant decrease in OPEC’s oil production.  
From 1974 to 1978, the producer price index (PPI)
 
for crude energy materials increased 
by over 60%.
8
  During this time the consumer price index (CPI) for all items grew by 
32% while the CPI for gasoline alone increased by 23%.
9
 
                                                          
6
 This system established financial rules and regulations among the world’s top industrial states. 
7
 OPEC is the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
8
 See http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PPICEM 
9
 See http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPIAUCSL; 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CUUR0000SETB01 
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In 1978, Iran’s oil sector began protesting and without labor the amount of Iranian 
oil production decreased substantially.  The decrease was about 7% of the world’s 
production (Hamilton 2011).  By 1979 levels were about back to normal.  Then in 1980 
Iraq declared war on Iran, halting production in both countries.  This led to another world 
production decrease of about 6% (Hamilton 2011).  By looking at the PPI for crude oil 
and the CPI for gasoline, there can be seen two distinct spikes separating the oil price 
shock of 1978 from that of 1980.
10
  From 1979 to 1981 the average imported price of 
crude oil rose by 37%.
11
  Through the mid 1980’s total petroleum consumption steadily 
declined.  Figure B shows the relationship between the average import price of crude oil, 
CPI for gasoline and PPI for finished energy goods.   It is worth noting that the CPI for 
gasoline and the PPI for finished goods are nearly identical except that the PPI line is 
slightly under the CPI line.  This makes sense because firms must raise prices in order to 
push as much cost onto the consumer as they can.  Then, looking at the average import 
price of crude oil line, you can see that from 1978 to 1980 it is the same as the CPI for 
gasoline line.  There is definitely correlation and this could possibly suggest causation 
between the two.  Furthermore, Iraqi oil production resumed and was back to normal 
levels by the late 1980’s.  Then, 1990 was the start of the Gulf War when Iraq invaded 
Kuwait.  The price spike in oil proved to be of very short duration.  The Saudis took 
excess capacity they had been storing and used it to replenish the world’s oil supply 
(Hamilton 2011). 
The most recent energy crisis the United States has experienced began with the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.  The effect on global supply was much smaller than any crisis 
                                                          
10
 See Figure A 
11
 See http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/ 
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before.  From 2003 to 2008 the average imported price of crude oil rose dramatically.  
From 2003 to 2008 PPI for crude energy materials rose nearly 40% while the CPI for 
gasoline increased over 110%.
12
  However, many believe that the post war recession felt 
by the United States in 2007 was largely due to the financial crisis rather than oil related 
problems and exogenous geopolitical events (Hamilton 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 See http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PPICEM; 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CUUR0000SETB01 
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Figure A 
 
Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PPICEM; 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CUUR0000SETB01.  The producer price index (PPI) for crude 
energy materials is collected annually, not seasonally adjusted and indexed at 1982=100. The CPI for 
gasoline is for all types of gasoline, seasonally adjusted and indexed at 1982-84=100. 
 
 
Figure B 
 
Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CUUR0000SETB01; 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PPIFEG; http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/.  The CPI for gasoline is 
for all types of gasoline, seasonally adjusted and indexed at 1982-84=100.  PPI for finished energy goods is 
collected annually, seasonally adjusted and indexed at 1982=100.  The annual average imported crude oil 
price is in 2012 dollars and in units of real dollars per barrel. 
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Section 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The United States has experienced fluctuations in crude oil prices since the 
1970’s.  During 1973, 1978, 1980 and 1990 oil prices spiked and the country experienced 
a time of economic downturn.  However,  from 2001 to 2006 real oil prices more than 
tripled and the country did not see recessionary characteristics.  Output grew, 
unemployment decreased and inflation was moderate (Nordhaus 2007).  Oil price shocks 
are thought to be contractionary because of the effects on productivity and aggregate 
demand.  For example, productivity could be affected due to the substitution of labor for 
energy.  If crude oil prices increase, firms may have to cut costs.  This could mean 
employing fewer workers.  Despite crude oil price shocks historically having adverse 
effects on GDP in the past, recently they have not had as much of an inverse relationship 
and are more or less random than compared to previous decades.  Thus, Nordhaus (2007) 
does not feel that the recent oil price shock had any significant macroeconomic outcomes 
like the other shocks and claims that people have begun to think of these price increases 
like they would a permanent tax increase.  The marginal propensity to consume is a lot 
higher for the buyers than it is for the sellers.  This suggests that consumers are not 
viewing shocks to the price of crude oil as short term fluctuations.  People now see oil 
prices as being more volatile over longer time periods and are not so quick to alter their 
energy consumption patterns.  People therefore attempt to smooth their consumption by 
purchasing less of other goods in order to spend the same amount on energy that they 
normally would.  Nordhaus  also argues that policies should be made based on the “world 
oil market” and not the amount that is imported into the country, conjecturing that macro 
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externalities would arise due to the total domestic expenditure on oil and not based on 
how much is imported (Nordhaus 2009).  This is because crude oil imports are 
categorized as domestic gross output as opposed to domestic value added.  Therefore, 
holding capital and labor fixed, oil price shocks do not increase value added and cannot 
be considered productivity shocks to GDP (Killian 2008).   
Many economists believe that energy price increases are completely different 
from any other goods.  This is mainly due to the fact that energy price increases occur at 
much different times that are considered unusual than those of other goods.  It is possible 
that energy price shocks are much more important and should be followed closer than 
other price increases because of the inelastic nature of things such as crude oil.  Another 
reason that energy prices are viewed differently than other commodities is because of 
situations where things tend to manipulate their prices that are completely exogenous to 
our nation’s economy.  This would be referring to natural disasters, war and other 
political problems in foreign countries.  Natural disasters such as Hurricane Rita and 
Katrina did not affect the supply of crude oil as much as it did the supply of gasoline.  
This made for a huge spike in gasoline prices.  Killian (2008) explains that crude oil 
supply shocks have little effect on prices and that the effects are better measured by 
peoples’ expectations (of future crude oil production) and demand for crude oil.  
Therefore, he feels that it is better to focus on retail energy prices, such as gasoline, when 
determining how energy price shocks will affect the U.S. economy (opposed to primary 
energy/crude oil).   
With this being said, it is also widely accepted that crude oil prices do affect the 
United States’ economy.  The supply and demand for energy “depend on global 
10 
 
macroeconomic aggregates such as global economic activity and interest rates” (Killian 
2008).  This is why the increased oil prices are most likely correlated with the United 
States’ macroeconomic situation but not necessarily imply that there is causation.   
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Section 4 
DATA 
All of the data has been collected annually by different sources.  The data 
collected in order to test how crude oil price shocks affect GDP only dates back to 1968 
in order to avoid as much irrelevant and/or omitted variable bias as possible.  Each 
observation has been collected from the first quarter of 1968 until the first quarter of 
2011.   
The dependent variable is real GDP, which is the inflation adjusted value of goods 
and services produced in the United States.  This information has been obtained from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) website.13  It is collected annually and is 
seasonally adjusted.  Since the value of the dollar changes over time, it has been chained 
to billions of 2005 dollars.   
Each independent variable can be found on the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) website.14  The first independent variable will be the domestic 
crude oil first purchase price.
15
  It will be abbreviated as DOP and its units are in dollars 
per barrel.  Next will be the amount of domestic crude oil production, which will be 
abbreviated as DOProd.
16
  Here the EIA measures production in thousands of barrels.  
It is not unusual for many economists to focus strictly on the price of imported oil 
in order to determine if crude oil price shocks cause contractions in our domestic 
economy.  This is because they believe that it effects production decisions of firms who 
                                                          
13
 See http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp 
14
 See http://www.eia.gov/ 
15
 See http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_dfp1_k_a.htm 
16
 See http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/ 
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have expectations of future contractions in the demand for their goods and/or services 
(Killian 2008).  Therefore the price of imported oil will be included in the regression 
analysis as well as the quantity that is imported into the country. These variables will be 
abbreviated as IOP and IOQ respectively.  The imported oil price (IOP) is defined as the 
annual average imported crude oil price and is measured in real 2012 dollars per barrel.  
The quantity of crude oil imported is recorded in thousands of barrels.
17
 
Additionally an oil shock independent variable is constructed.  A standard way to 
implement an oil shock variable is to use real or nominal dollars.  A model for this 
variable is used that is similar to one created by Killian (2008).  However, in Killian’s oil 
shock variable, he takes the natural log of the nominal price of oil divided by the previous 
period’s price and then multiples this by the lagged nominal price of oil times lagged 
consumption and divided by lagged nominal GDP.  Basing this study’s variable off of 
this, nominal values are substituted for real domestic oil price and real GDP.  Further the 
current period’s price, consumption and GDP level is used for the second half of the 
equation: 
 LnOilShock = [ln (DOP/DOPt-1)]*[(DOPt*DPETCONt )/GDPt] 
Where DOP is the domestic oil price and DPETCON is defined as domestic petroleum 
consumption and its units are in quadrillion BTU’s.18 The variable GDP is used as the 
denominator in order to give an idea of the value of oil consumption as a share of GDP.  
This equation for an oil price shock should help indicate when one is occurring.  
However there are some problems with it.  The main problem is that it does not take 
                                                          
17
 http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/ 
18
 BTU refers to the traditional British Thermal Unit 
13 
 
consumers’ elasticity of demand for crude oil or petroleum products into account.  This 
way we are unaware of their spending patterns regardless of what the domestic price may 
be in period t. 
Killian (2008) asserts that energy price shocks have a sure effect on the economy 
because these shocks disrupt consumers’ spending on goods and services other than 
energy.  Hence the belief that firms see oil price shocks as a shock to the demand for their 
product rather than a shock to how much it is going to cost them to be able to produce 
whatever their energy dependent product may be.  People will tend to smooth their 
consumption as much as possible on other commodities in order to not suffer losses in 
their consumption of energy.  The hypothesis made agrees with this and predicts this to 
be true and therefore the same regression that is run on GDP will be applied to personal 
consumption patterns as well.  However, the personal consumption that will be used as a 
dependent variable is less food and energy in order to see if commodities other than 
energy are affected by oil price shocks.
14 
 
Section 5 
METHADOLOGY 
 The model chosen in order to estimate the effect crude oil prices and price shocks 
have on real GDP contains five independent variables.  The following equation has been 
constructed: 
1)  GDPt = β0 - β1DOPt + β2DOProdt - β3IOPt + β4IOQt - β5LnOilShockt + ε 
In the first model, one can see that it is predicted that some variables will have 
contractionary effects, decreasing GDP, while others are expected to increase it.  The 
regression will then be run using OLS estimation and robust standard errors in order to 
correct for any heteroskedasticity. 
 The second model estimated has the same dependent and independent variables.  
However, each of the independent variables will be lagged one period behind.  If Model 1 
does not produce logical results explaining the relationship between domestic crude oil 
price shocks and GDP, this second model should: 
2)  GDPt = β0 - β1DOPt-1 + β2DOProdt-1 - β3IOPt-1 + β4IOQt-1 - β5LnOilShockt-1 + ε 
Model 2 may be a better equation for the estimation because it can give a better idea of 
how the price, quantity and production of oil in the previous period help to explain GDP 
in the next.     
DOP is the domestic crude oil first purchase price and believed to have a negative 
coefficient.  Once domestic prices increase the price shock will hurt producers and 
decrease the demand for their products.  Once consumers decrease consumption, GDP 
will then decline.  Next is the independent variable DOProd.  This variable represents the 
amount of crude oil produced domestically.  This variable’s coefficient is expected to be 
15 
 
positive and increase GDP as production increases.  With increased domestic oil 
production, there is more work coupled with more products on the market.  With more 
work available, producers do not have to substitute labor for capital in order to produce 
the same amount.  Therefore, if unemployment decreases GDP will increase.  Next there 
is IOP, which stands for the average imported oil price.  IOP is hypothesized to have a 
negative coefficient.  This is due to the fact that if the price for imported oil continues to 
rise, so will the PPI and then the CPI.  This will cause a chain reaction resulting in a 
decrease in consumption and then contractionary effects on real GDP.  On the other hand 
IOQ, which stands for the quantity of imported oil, is anticipated to have the opposite 
result that the price of imported oil has on the macroeconomy and will produce positive 
effects on GDP.  Once the United States has demand up and is meeting this increased 
demand for energy with an increased supply of imported oil, consumers should then 
increase consumption and inject the macroeconomy with currency.  Finally, there is the 
natural log of an oil price shock variable denoted as LnOilShock.  During times of a crude 
oil energy price shock, this will inflate the price of our oil and petroleum commodities 
severely increasing CPI and hence decreasing the demand for energy as well as energy 
complimented goods.  This could increase unemployment, and inflation while decreasing 
consumption across markets.  If things such as unemployment and inflation do rise and 
consumption falls, real GDP will decline. 
Then, a third model is created and a regression will be run using personal 
consumption expenditures (excluding food and energy) as the dependent variable.  The 
same independent variables will be used in order to answer whether or not these crude oil 
16 
 
characteristics affect consumer consumption patterns of commodities other than crude oil 
(or other petroleum products).  This third equation is modeled as follows: 
3)  PCLFEt = β0 - β1DOPt + β2DOProdt - β3IOPt + β4IOQt - β5LnOilShockt + ε 
Here the dependent variable, PCLFE, is an abbreviation for personal consumption less 
food and energy.  If Model 1 and 2 fail to produce any results that allow the conclusion 
that crude oil energy price shocks can and will affect GDP, then this model might be able 
to help explain why.  If the results seem more accurate for model 3, then this would help 
support what Hamilton (2011) says about oil price increases being exogenous of GDP 
and only has correlation. 
 This study hypothesizes that people do tend to smooth their consumption and 
energy consumption will not change near as much as other goods and services.  Therefore 
the independent variables should have the same coefficients as they did on real GDP.  
When crude oil prices increase, it will decrease expenditures on products other than food 
and energy.  Inversely, when production and quantity of crude oil are increased, the price 
of energy related goods will fall, thus allowing consumers to resume their normal 
spending habits and increase consumption of goods and services less energy. 
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Section 6 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results obtained after running the OLS estimation on Model 1 can be seen in 
Table 1.  Based on the hypothesis for Model 1, all the variables have the correct signs on 
their coefficients except for the domestic oil price and the domestic oil production.  This 
first model obtained an R-squared value of 0.9771.  Aside from the oil price shock 
variable, all the independent variables demonstrate statistical significance. 
The results from Model 1 show that for every dollar per barrel increase in the 
domestic price of crude oil, there will be an increase of 64.58 billion dollars in real GDP.  
This was unexpected, but based off of the t-statistic and p-value, this variable 
demonstrates strong statistical significance.  Although the sign of the coefficient was 
unexpected, it may be following the reverse causality that Killian (2008) speaks of when 
he says that it is actually when GDP increases that there will be an increase in the price of 
crude oil.  The next variable for domestic oil production also gave me an unexpected 
sign.  The results for this variable says that for every thousand barrels the United States 
increases in domestic production, real GDP will decrease by 0.0022 billion dollars.  This 
variable is also highly significant and could be right.  This is most likely due to the 
production cost of constructing drills and rigs in order to obtain the oil and then having to 
pay people to maintain the operation.  There is a possibility that in order to achieve the 
correct estimates for this coefficient, one would have to hold capital and labor fixed. 
Looking at the imported oil price variable, expected results were obtained and it is 
statistically significant.  Model 1 depicts that for every dollar per barrel the price for 
imported crude oil increases, GDP will decrease by 28.01 billion dollars.  If firms have to 
18 
 
pay more to obtain a product they are going to naturally raise the price.  This was seen in 
Figure B when the CPI and PPI line followed the same path but the PPI line was always 
just below that of the CPI line.  This is in support of  the argument that shocks to the 
price of imported crude oil could affect demand enough to cause contractionary economic 
events, and decrease GDP.  Then, the results for imported crude oil quantity say that if 
the amount of imported crude oil increases by one thousand barrels, GDP should rise by 
0.00096 billion dollars.  Although this variable has the correct sign and is statistically 
significant, the effect it has on GDP is relatively small.  This could be due to Killian’s 
point that crude oil imports are categorized as domestic gross output rather than value 
added and cannot be considered a productivity shock to GDP (Killian 2008). 
Finally there is the oil price shock variable.  This variable is only statistically 
significant against a two-sided test at the 10% level of significance.  Each of the other 
variables turned out to all portray significance against a two-sided test at the 5% level.  
Because of this, it is enough to say that the oil shock variable is not significant in 
explaining how real GDP behaves and is therefore insignificant to this model. 
    For Model 1, it is best to try and run the sort of regression that will correct for 
any heteroskedasticity bias.  Therefore the residuals were plotted to further examine the 
possible presence of this bias.
19
  From this I can see that there is probably the presence of 
heteroskedasticity.  In order to correct this problem, the regression was run using robust 
standard errors.  The results in Table 1 are presented with these results.  A correlation 
table was then created along with the implementation of a variance inflation factors (VIF)  
test to get an idea of how much each independent variable is correlated with each other 
                                                          
19
 The plotted residuals for Model 1 can be seen on Table 2. 
19 
 
and if there are any signs of multicollinearity.
20
  Based on the correlation table it can be 
seen that the imported oil quantity variable is highly correlated with the amount of 
domestic oil production.  Also, based on the VIF table, DOProd and IOQ both have high 
degrees of multicollinearity.
21
  It is likely that there is one of two problems.  First, it 
could be an irrelevant variable bias and the heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity 
problem will be fixed by dropping either IOQ or DOProd.  Or it could be an omitted 
variable bias and there is some variable that is essential to the equation and is being left 
out. 
Although the hypothesis for the domestic variables’ coefficients was wrong, the 
broader hypothesis was not.  Domestic and imported oil prices were significant in 
explaining the behavior of real GDP.  Given the information from Model 1, it appears 
that both the domestic oil price and the imported oil price have an effect on real GDP 
with the unexpected result that an increase in the imported price of crude oil is the only 
one that has contractionary effects (not including the oil price shock variable). 
Model 2 contains the same dependent and independent variables as Model 1.  The 
difference is that in Model 2 all the independent variables are lagged one period behind in 
order to try and capture how they explain real GDP in the following period.  From this 
OLS estimation it is found that all the resulting signs on the coefficients for the lagged 
independent variables are the same as they were in Model 1.
22
  On the other hand, unlike 
Model 1, Model 2’s results show that all the lagged independent variables are statistically 
significant against a two-sided test at the 5% significance level. 
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 Correlation and VIF tables for Model 1 can be seen on Table 3. 
21
 Any variables with a VIF score greater than 10.0, is thought to have severe multicollinearity problems. 
1/VIF is the Tolerance.  Tolerance ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, with 1.0 signifying no multicollinearity.  
22
 The OLS estimation results for Model 2 can be found on Table 4. 
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Also different from Model 1, in Model 2 the lagged oil price shock variable 
(lagLnOilShock) is statistically significant.  It explains that for every period that there is 
an increase in the price of oil consumption as a share of GDP in period t, real GDP 
should decrease by 7778.552 billion dollars in year t + 1.  This supports the hypothesis 
that during times of an oil shock, contractionary effects are seen on GDP. 
Before running the regression with robust standard errors, to test the reliability of 
Model 2, the residuals were plotted in order to try and eyeball whether there is the 
presence of heteroskedasticity or not.
23
  Looking at Table 6 it seems as though there is 
more of a constant variance in Model 2 than there was in Model 1 but it is possible that 
there is still the presence of heteroskedasticity.  Therefore the regression was run using 
robust standard errors and the results shown in Table 4 depict this.  A correlation and VIF 
table was made to see if this model has any issues with multicollinearity.
24
  According to 
the correlation table, as well as the VIF table, the lagged domestic oil production and 
imported oil quantity variables have strong indications of multicollinearity. 
Then, with Model 2, in an attempt to fix the problem of multicollinearity one of 
the variables with a high VIF score was dropped.  In the new estimation (Model 2.1) 
lagged variable for imported oil quantity was dropped.  Once lagIOQ was dropped from 
the estimation, the variable lagLnOilShock immediately became insignificant.  In addition 
to that, lagIOP was borderline insignificant with a p-value of 0.049.
25
 
Instead of going any further with more testing on this revised model, the variable 
lagIOQ was replaced back into the model and instead lagDOProd was dropped from the 
estimation to see if I could obtain all significant variables (Model 2.2).  This did in fact 
                                                          
23
 The plot of Model 2’s residuals can be found on Table 5. 
24
 Model 2’s correlation and VIF table can be found on Table 6. 
25
 The results for Model 2.1 (excluding lagIOQ) are on Table 7. 
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result in all the current independent variables showing statistical significance at the 5% 
level.
26
  Furthermore, a new correlation table and VIF test reveal that there are no more 
multicollinearity possibilities among these independent variables.  The VIF table also 
displays the lowest mean value VIF out of all the estimated models.
27
  Therefore this 
seems to be the most accurate model out of the ones that have been estimated.  According 
to Model 2.2, when domestic oil price increases, so does GDP.  Once again we see that 
when imported oil prices increase this has contractionary effects on real GDP. 
Finally, I ran a supplementary regression to see if these same independent 
variables are affecting the consumption patterns of goods and services besides energy.  
This is to help try and decipher if oil price shocks are a demand or supply side problem.  
Since Model 2.2 worked out so well without the presence of lagDOProd, I went ahead 
and left the un-lagged variable DOProd out of Model 3’s estimation: 
3)  PCLFEt = β0 - β1DOPt – β2IOPt + β3IOQt – β4LnOilShockt + ε 
All of the independent variables included in Model 3 came out significant at the 
5% level.  Robust standard errors are used and there appears to be no presence of 
multicollinearity based on the VIF test.
28
  The results from this are nearly identical to 
those found in Model 2.2 in the sense that the signs of the coefficients are the same.  The 
only difference is that the effect these variables have on consumption (less food and 
energy) is much smaller than the effect they have shown to have on GDP.  Nonetheless 
the relationship is still there.   
In Model 2.2 we obtained results saying that the lagged value of domestic oil 
production was not significant to the equation.  However, to test further whether or not 
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 The results for Model 2.2 (excluding lagDOProd) are on Table 8. 
27
 The Correlation Table and VIF test for Model 2.2 are on Table 9. 
28
 The OLS results and VIF test for Model 3 can be found on Tables 10 and 11 respectively. 
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lagDOProd is significant, a fourth model was created.  This model instead drops the 
domestic and imported oil price variables.  Suspecting that the price of domestic crude oil 
is dependent upon the price of imported crude oil, a weighted average variable was 
created in their place.  This resulted in the following equation: 
4) GDPt = β0 + β1DOProdt-1 + β2IOQt-1 -  β3WAPCt-1 -  β4LnOilShockt-1 + ε 
In Model 4, all the independent variables are lagged.  The independent variable WAPC is 
defined as the weighted average of the price of crude oil.  This was derived as follows: 
 WAPC = [(DOP * DOProd) + (IOP * IOQ)] 
(DOProd + IOQ) 
Here the domestic crude oil price is multiplied by domestic crude oil production and is 
added to the value of the imported crude oil price multiplied by the imported crude oil 
quantity.  The value of the numerator is then dived by domestic crude oil production plus 
the quantity of imported oil.   
 The regression using Model 4 gives an R-squared value of 0.9515.
29
  From the 
results it is found that now that lagDOProd is significant along with all the other values 
against a two sided test at the 5% significance level except for lagIOQ.  The variable 
lagIOQ is now highly insignificant with a p-value of 0.957.  None of the hypothesized 
signs of the coefficients were correct except for the oil shock variable.  Also in this model 
the lagged value of DOProd just as it was in Models 2 and 2.1.  Based on Model 4’s VIF 
table, there is a high degree of multicollinearity between the variables lagDOProd and 
lagIOQ.
30
  Due to this, lagIOQ was then dropped from the equation (Model 4.1) and all 
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 The OLS results for Model 4 are on Table 12. 
30
 The correlation and VIF tables for Model 4 are found on Table 12. 
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independent variables were found significant at the 5% level.  A new VIF table was then 
run and there were no signs of multicollinearity.
31
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 The OLS results and VIF table for Model 4.1 are found on Table 13. 
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Section 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based off the results from the OLS estimations, I conclude that crude oil prices 
are endogenous of GDP.  Contrary to what was hypothesized, in every model, the price of 
domestic crude oil was highly significant and positive.  This means that as the price of 
domestic crude oil increases, so does GDP.  Model 2.2 supports Killian’s view that there 
could possibly be reverse causality and that as GDP increases the domestic price of 
domestic crude oil increases as well.  However, when it comes to contractionary effects 
of crude oil price shocks, only the imported crude oil price supported this.  Not only are 
firms paying abroad for these imports, but at least some of the money spent by consumers 
on energy products will not be recycled back into the domestic economy, resulting in a 
decline in GDP.  Nordhaus (2009) also says that macro externalities would arise due to 
the total domestic expenditure.  This may help explain why DOProd had a negative 
coefficient  
Looking at the results from Model 3, personal consumption less food and energy 
decreases when the price of imported crude oil increases and/or there is a crude oil price 
shock.  This is interesting because this suggests that people actually do change the way 
they consume based off of crude oil energy prices and price shocks in an attempt to 
smooth their consumption.  This could in turn effect GDP if consumption declines 
enough or for long enough.  Once the price of crude oil changes how we consume, which 
then effects GDP, this becomes a demand side problem.  Although the recent spike in oil 
prices in the early 2000’s could have effected consumption, it may have not effected 
consumption enough to see economic downturns as bad as in the 1970’s and 1980’s. 
25 
 
Results from Model 4 show that the quantity of imported crude oil is insignificant 
and that the sign on the coefficient for domestic oil production is negative.  This again 
agrees with Nordhaus’ (2009) point about macro externalities being caused by domestic 
expenditure. 
So why did the most recent energy price shock not hurt the economy as much as 
shocks in the past?  It could be that the oil price shocks of 1973 had a lot to do with 
exogenous political events, such as bad policy that enhanced the contractionary effects on 
the macroeconomy.  Oil price controls were implemented during a time of oil price 
shocks.  Another reason may be simply that the magnitude of the oil price shock in the 
early 2000’s was smaller now than they were before.  It could also be due to the fact that 
producers and consumers view and therefore react differently to changes in the price of 
oil.  Nordhaus (2007) says that people are starting to view energy increases as a 
permanent tax and instead of altering their consumption of energy, they smooth 
consumption elsewhere which would explain why Model 3 shows the import price of 
crude oil and the oil shock variable with negative signs.  
In the case that the bad policies of the 1970’s were coupled with a severe oil price 
shock, it would be in policy makers’ best interest to try and lessen the impact that oil 
prices have on GDP in the future.  A start would be to reconfigure tax incentives towards 
domestic oil producers so that it can help to balance out the high cost of labor and capital 
which seems to be the reason for OLS results displaying a negative coefficient for 
domestic oil production.  Along with domestic production, foreign policies need to be 
implemented with other oil producing countries in an attempt to reduce the world oil 
price.  These foreign policies would have to be coupled with environmental regulations 
26 
 
on things such as carbon emissions.  This is because if prices get too low and 
consumption of oil increases with every dollar that oil decreases, the environment will 
take a tremendous hit.  Along with issues on the environment and thinking more long-
run, the amount of government funded research for technological innovation for 
renewable and non-renewable energies should be increased to the capacity that the 
country is financially able to support.  More tax incentives should be offered to not only 
producers of renewable energy but also to firms and households that consume it.  These 
tax breaks could be increased by not only the dollar amount but by the range of possible 
ways to qualify for them. 
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Table 1 - Model 1 OLS Estimation Results 
GDP Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
t P>t 
DOP 64.57688 9.982637 6.47 0.000 
DOProd -.0021587 .0007687 -2.81 0.008 
IOP -28.01221 6.309187 -4.44 0.000 
IOQ .0009576 .0003553 2.70 0.010 
LnOilShock -4902.175 2738.662 -1.79 0.081 
Constant 11726.7 2820.098 4.16 0.000 
 
Number of Observations = 44 
R-Squared = 0.9771 
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Table 2 - Plotted Residuals for Model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
0
0
0
-5
0
0
0
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
R
e
si
d
u
a
ls
4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000
Fitted values
29 
 
Table 3 - Model 1 Correlation and VIF Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GDP DOP DOProd IOP IOQ LnOilShock 
       
GDP 1.0000      
DOP 0.7647 1.0000     
DOProd -0.9716 -0.6858 1.0000    
IOP 0.2384 0.7102 -0.1863 1.0000   
IOQ 0.9231 0.6184 -0.9546 0.2345 1.0000  
LnOilShock 0.2639 0.4885 -0.2661 0.5342 0.2927 1.0000 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
   
DOProd 26.74 0.037392 
IOQ 17.49 0.057181 
DOP 8.38 0.119354 
IOP 4.82 0.207413 
LnOilShock 1.47 0.680629 
   
Mean VIF 11.78  
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Table 4 - Model 2 OLS Estimation Results  
GDP Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
t P>t 
lagDOP 59.77284 13.96751 4.28 0.000 
lagDOProd -.0023341 .0008454 -2.76 0.009 
lagIOP -26.92279 7.416392 -3.63 0.001 
lagIOQ .0009756 .0003815 2.56 0.015 
lagLnOilShock -7778.552 3422.893 -2.27 0.029 
Constant 12467.5 3082.113 4.05 0.000 
 
Number of Observations = 43 
R-Squared = 0.9691 
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Table 5 – Plotted Residuals for Model 2 
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Table 6 - Model 2 Correlation and VIF Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GDP lagDOP lagDOProd lagIOP lagIOQ lagLnOilShock 
       
GDP 1.0000      
lagDOP 0.7336 1.0000     
lagDOProd 0.9712 -0.6899 1.0000    
lagIOP 0.1376 0.6559 -0.1284 1.0000   
lagIOQ 0.9252 0.6289 -0.9540 0.1951 1.0000  
lagLnOilShock 0.1777 0.4256 -0.2275 0.4865 0.2647 1.0000 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
   
lagDOProd 26.18 0.038199 
lagIOQ 17.12 0.058402 
lagDOP 7.33 0.136418 
lagIOP 4.26 0.234883 
lagLnOilShock 1.37 0.731262 
   
Mean VIF 11.25  
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Table 7 – Model 2.1 OLS Estimation Results (excluding lagIOQ) 
GDP Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
t P>t 
lagDOP 42.31266 13.71227 3.09 0.004 
lagDOProd -.0044278 .0003254 -13.61 0.000 
lagIOP -15.46715 7.610236 -2.03 0.049 
lagLnOilShock -7060.375 3671.197 -1.92 0.062 
Constant 20199.8 909.3521 22.21 0.000 
 
Number of Observations = 43 
R-Squared = 0.9629 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table 8 – Model 2.2 OLS Estimation Results (excluding lagDOProd) 
GDP Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
t P>t 
lagDOP 84.4905 13.09975 6.45 0.000 
lagIOP -41.92337 7.747758 -5.41 0.000 
lagIOQ .0019397 .0001504 12.90 0.000 
lagLnOilShock -8144.207 3436.284 -2.37 0.023 
Constant 4100.145 317.9764 12.89 0.000 
 
Number of Observations = 43 
R-Squared = 0.9623 
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Table 9 – Model 2.2 Correlation and VIF Tables (excluding lagDOProd) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GDP lagDOP lagIOP lagIOQ lagLnOilShock 
      
GDP 1.0000     
lagDOP 0.7336 1.0000    
lagIOP 0.1376 0.6559 1.0000   
lagIOQ 0.9252 0.6289 0.1951 1.0000  
lagLnOilShock 0.1777 0.4256 0.4865 0.2647 1.0000 
Variable   VIF 1/VIF   
lagDOP 3.24 0.308509 
lagIOP 2.27 0.439648 
lagIOQ 1.95 0.513776 
lagLnOilShock 1.37 0.732253 
   
Mean VIF 2.21  
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Table 10 – Model 3 (excluding DOProd) Results 
PCLFE Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
t P>t 
DOP .7529926 .1344693 5.60 0.000 
IOP -.3429712 .1100335 -3.12 0.003 
IOQ .0000177 1.98e-06 8.93 0.000 
LnOilShock -120.1361 47.87533 -2.51 0.016 
Constant 26.59896 5.791468 4.59 0.000 
 
Number of Observations = 44   
R-Squared = 0.9047 
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Table 11 – Model 3 (excluding DOProd) Correlation and VIF Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 PCLFE DOP IOP IOQ LnOilShock 
PCLFE 1.0000     
DOP 0.7179 1.0000    
IOP 0.2102 0.7102 1.0000   
IOQ 0.8920 0.6184 0.2345 1.0000  
LnOilShock 0.1923 0.4885 0.5342 0.2927 1.0000 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
DOP 3.59 0.278338 
IOP 2.61 0.383293 
IOQ 1.90 0.526352 
LnOilShock 1.47 0.681961 
Mean VIF 2.39  
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Table 12 – Model 4 OLS and VIF Table Results 
GDP Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
t P>t   
lagDOProd -.0051416 .0006328 -8.13 0.000 
lagIOQ -.0000188 .0003426 -0.05 0.957 
lagWAPC 16.20432 6.202885 2.61 0.013 
lagLnOilShock -8993.396 3536.228 -2.54 0.015 
Constant 21960.51 2437.303 9.01 0.000 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
lagIOQ 11.48 0.087144 
lagDOProd 11.45 0.087315 
lagWAPC 1.91 0.523433 
lagLnOilShock 1.36 0.735325 
   
Mean VIF 6.55  
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Table 13 – Model 4.1 OLS and VIF Table Results 
GDP Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t   
lagDOProd -.0051093 .000204 -25.05 0.000 
lagWAPC 16.18202 6.098373 2.65 0.011 
lagLnOilShock -9019.917 3364.454 -2.68 0.011 
Constant 21831.88 620.3945 35.19 0.000 
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
   
lagWAPC 1.90 0.525235 
lagDOProd 1.51 0.662904 
lagLnOilShock 1.34 0.745936 
   
Mean VIF 1.58  
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